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Abstract
This paper examines the role of plan recognition and plan
generation in communication. It argues that people in
interaction with others organize their perceptions of a social
situation in terms of plans even when the others' plans are
poorly formulated. They use their models of others' plans in
formulating their own. Much of what occurs in discourse centers
on a continual communication about and reformulation of one's own
plans and one's models of others' plans. Formal methods for
describing and analyzing plans are now available. Such methods
allow us to be more explicit in our hypotheses about social
interaction. Unfortunately, the classical formalisms for
planning are derived from a robot world model that fails to
generalize sufficiently to account for typical human planning
situations. By pushing the classical model we come to a model of
planning that embodies concepts such as mutual belief, social
episode, and goal conflict. Using the mutual belief model we
look at a simple dialogue. It is clear from the analysis that
elements of the model are necessary for modeling such dialogues,
but not sufficient. More complex dialogues and texts will
undoubtedly require further elaboration of the model.
Robot Plans and Human Plans:
Implications for Models of Communication
The Peanuts comic strip has a character named Lucy who is
always trying to take advantage of one named Charlie Brown.
Because Charlie is very trusting, her tricks often succeed. One
of her favorite tricks occurs in the fall when football season is
getting underway: Lucy holds a football and says, "Come on
Charlie Brown! I'll hold the football for you. You come and
kick it." Charlie runs as fast as he can, swings his leg back
and tries to kick the ball. At the last second Lucy yanks the
ball away, Charlie's feet fly up in the air and he lands on his
back. His pride is wounded as well as his bottom.
One year, Charlie started thinking,
"She says she's going to hold the ball so I can run up and
kick it, but I know she's going to pull it away. She always
pulls it away. She thinks that I don't know what she's
planning to do, but, in fact, I do. I also know that she
thinks that I don't know. I'm going to trick her. Instead
of running up and kicking the ball I'll just run up and
stop. Then she can't pull the ball away and make me fall on
my back."
But then he goes further,
"She can figure out that I know what her plan is. She's
probably not going to yank the ball away after all. I'll
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run up, stop, and be embarrassed, this time because there'll
be no trick."
Following this line of reasoning he finally concludes that the
best strategy is just to run as hard as he can and kick the ball.
He runs right up and swings his leg back. Lucy jerks the ball
away; he tries to kick it and lands flat on his back; and, of
course, sets himself up for next year's football season.
We live in a world of intentionality, a world in which we
assign meaning to objects, relations, and events. One of the
primary kinds of meaning that we assign is planful behavior.
That is, we look at what people do and say, "What are their
goals? What are the actions that they are going to carry out to
achieve those goals? What are their plans?" We seek
interpretations of actions in terms of plans even in cases where
behavior may not be all that planful. Referring to an action as
aimless highlights the fact that it is very unusual for people to
act without some goal in mind.
This paper discusses the role of plans in understanding
discourse. It looks briefly at an example of what might be
called a "robot model," or perhaps the "standard AI model" for
plans, a model used widely in Artificial Intelligence, as well as
in a wide variety of other disciplines. It then presents some
problems that arise when this standard model is used to account
for general human action. A contrasting model, the "mutual-
belief model," is then presented by means of an example from a
corpus (Hall, Linn, & Nagy, 1984) of children's conversations.
In a simple episode, we see something of the richness of human
planfulness. Finally, some open questions are resented.
The Standard AI Model for Planni g .
Plans have been used in a wide variety of whys in the study
of discourse: to look at interactions of characters in stories
(Bruce & Newman, 1978; Wilensky, 1981), to look at the
interactions of the plans and purposes of an author with the
plans and purposes of a reader (Brewer & Lichtenstein, 1982;
Bruce, 1981), to look at the various plans of participants in
conversation. Most of these analyses have relied on some form of
information processing model that provides an explicit
representation of actions, states of the world, goals and the
process of planning. There is a long tradition to this work,
going back to Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960). The example
to follow is a bit of a caricature of this view of planning and
problem solving, but it suggests how people have been using terms
like "operators" and "states" and the kinds of problems that can
be solved.
Robot Worlds
First of all, one needs to have some way to represent a
state of the world. Typically what's done is to define a world
state by a list of propositions. Figure 1 shows a simple world
in which there are five points, or places where something can be;
there are boxes A, B and C; and there is a robot, who can move
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the boxes around. To represent a state of this world we might
use a set of propositions like the following:
Initial State
[On (Box-A, Floor)]
[On (Box-B, Floor)]
[On (Box-C, Box-B)]
[At (Box-A, P1)]
[At (Box-B, P2)]
[At (Robot, P3)]
This says that Box-A is on the Floor at point PI, the Robot
is at point P3, and so on.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Planning becomes relevant when we have operators which can
change states of the world. An example of an operation in the
micro-world might be for the robot to pick up a box. Operators
are typically defined in terms of enabling conditions, and
outcomes, or effects:
Operator: pick-up (X)
Enabling conditions: (eP) [At (Robot, P) & At (X, P)]
(eZ) Hold (Z)
(eZ) On (Z, X)
Effects: Hold (X)
The pick-up operator can be used only in certain states, for
example, the robot and the thing to be picked up have to be in
the same location. Also, the robot cannot be holding anything
and there can be nothing on the thing to be picked up. If the
pick-up operator is applied, the effect is that a proposition is
added to our description of the world: The robot now holds the
box.
Now, let's set up a goal state (see Figure 2), say, to have
Box C on Box A and the robot at P1. This looks like the initial
state with the exception of a couple of propositions:
Goal State
[On (Box-A, Floor)]
[On (Box-B, Floor)]
[On (Box-C, Box-A)]
[At (Box-A, PI)]
[At (Box-B, P2)]
[At (Robot, P1)]
Insert Figure 2 about here.
A planner can now operate to generate a sequence of
operators, such as: "the Robot moves to P2, picks up Box-C,
moves to P1, puts down Box-C." We call this sequence of
operators a "plan."
The Plan
Move (P2)
Pick-up (Box-C)
Move (P1)
Put-down (Box-C)
More elaborate examples than this can easily be constructed,
such as planning programs to write computer software or to solve
complex assemly tasks. In various fields, people have used
similar models to examine problem solving, composition, the
reader interaction with characters in stories, conversations and
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so on. It's fair to say that most planning research has relied
on models of this general form.
Limitations of the Standard AI Model
Unfortunately, there are limitations to the standard AI
model that appear when we try to account for human planning
behavior. (Most of these are acknowledged by those who have used
such a model in their research.)
The first problem is that robot planning is basically
planning for an individual. There is one robot moving around in
its micro-world. In contrast, human plans are essentially
social, that is, people operate in a social environment in which
they compete or cooperate with others. Even if there is another
robot in the robot's world, the plan constructed is an individual
plan; the other robot is an aspect of a passive environment. For
human plans, many apparently individual actions--a teacher at
home preparing a lesson for the next day--are still inherently
social (the teacher must imagine social contexts for his/her
actions).
Secondly, the robot operates in a world of facts. There is
a set of propositions each of which are simply true or false.
There may be some uncertainty about the propositions, and they
may change but they're essentially treated as solid facts. In
contrast, in human planning situations virtually everything has a
belief status. People act on the basis of what they believe to
be true, and what they believe about others' beliefs. In
conversations, for example, the operators are defined in terms of
changes to others' beliefs or questions about what they believe.
Moreover, these beliefs are recursive: It's not just your
beliefs, and your beliefs about someone else's beliefs, but your
beliefs about what they believe about you. For example, Charlie
Brown is trying to figure out his beliefs about Lucy's beliefs
about his beliefs.
Third, the standard AI model presupposes a fixed set of
operators, state variables, and goals. Neither the operators nor
the state variables change in the process of planning. There is
no way to add new locations or new boxes. Also, the goal is
fixed. The robot works to achieve the goal and either succeeds
or fails. In the human planning situation, there is an on-going,
and even a retrospective establishment of meaning. For example,
Gearhart and Newman (1980) report nursery school interactions, in
which a teacher talks to kids in the nursery school about the
pictures they have drawn. She says, "Here, let me-see your
picture." Until that moment the child might have been drawing
with the crayon on the paper, on the desk or on the wall. By her
statement the teacher seeks to establish that the object in
question is a picture and that the activity that the child was
doing was drawing a picture. When she points to an orange glob
on the paper and says, "Oh, that must be the sun," that orange
circle suddenly takes on a new status. This establishment of
meaning through interaction is a typical feature of human
interactions; we define the rules of the game as we go along.
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Fourth, the standard AI model tends to focus on the design
and execution of plans. Given an initial state, a goal state and
operators, the task is to construct the most efficient plan to
get from the initial state to the goal state, or, given a plan,
to execute it. In contrast, in human planning situations,
explicit planning is unusual, and there are few times when one
just carries out a plan. More often, people talk about plans;
they communicate plans to one another; and they use plans to
achieve other goals. Plans become part of what one comunicates:
A plan is announced because of the effect that information is
likely to have on someone else. These ways of dealing with plans
require more sophisticated representations than those provided by
the standard models.
Fifth, the standard AI model tends to separate the
generation process from the recognition process. Producing a
plan is one problem: How can we take an initial state and a
sequence of operators and get to a goal state? Recognizing a
plan is a separate problem: How can we infer a plan from a
sequence of actions? For human plan models, these processes need
to be considered together. Generating a plan is done while
recognizing what plans others are carrying out. One's own plan
may have to change in light of the recognition of what others are
planning. Similarly, if others recognize your plan in a certain
way, their plans may alter while you are in the process of
recognizing them. Recognition may depend upon simulating the
generation of a plan, understanding why somebody might have
produced the kind of plan they did.
Finally, in the standard AI model plans are generally
reversible. In the box example, we can switch the goal state and
initial state and make the same point. Exceptions occur only
when the domain introduces a directionality, say, in breaking an
egg. In contrast, human plans are basically historical. Actions
are non-reversible because they interact with and are even
defined in terms of a complex history of previous actions.
Mutual Belief Model
A number of people have been trying to find ways to
represent intentions and beliefs and to model social plans as
well as individual plans. Some of this work has been done with
computer modelling (Cohen, 1981; Perrault & Allen, 1980; Sidner &
Israel, 1981); some through analysis of conversations, stories,
and skits. This section presents one such attempt based on the
centrality of mutual belief (cf. Clark & Marshall, 1981; Cohen &
Perrault, 1979; Schiffer, 1972). We mention here the major
elements of a notation system that is being used in these
analyses. For further details, see Bruce (1980) or Bruce and
Newman (1978).
The notation system assumes an underlying facility for
representation of actions and states. Every proposition is
represented as embedded within a belief. A set of beliefs is
indicated by a belief space. Figure 3 shows equivalent
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representations of a proposition within the beliefs of some
character or participant. We also need to represent intentions
Insert Figure 3 about here.
~--~~-----~~-------~. - 
of at least two kinds. One is the intention to achieve
something, to bring about a new state of affairs (Figure 4). The
second is the intention to maintain some state (Figure 5).
Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here.
An important concept built out of individual beliefs is that
of mutual belief. Mutual belief means not only that one person
believes something that the other person believes, but also that
each believes that the other person believes it and that the
other believes that the first believes it, and so on indefinitely
(Schiffer, 1972). Using the notation presented thus far we can
define mutual belief (MB) of a proposition, X, between two
actors, F and R, as follows:
MB (F, R, X) <==> FB X
RB X
FB RB X
RB FB X
FB RB FB X
RB FB RB X
Closely related to the mutual belief concept is that of the
social episode (Figure 6). People can create a frame for their
interactions within which they establish social facts to be true
for the duration of that episode. Within the episode,
participants have well defined roles. There are many
conventional social episodes: For example, in a supermarket,
there is a checkout clerk and a customer, with corresponding
expectations about what each should do and know.
Insert Figure 6 about here.
The more interesting case is when people create new social
episodes. There is then a set of initiating actions to establish
the episode and a set of actions to close it. A social episode
is represented as a mutual belief state with the participants'
roles specified. Each side holds one participant's beliefs,
intentions and actions. The entire episode resides within the
larger belief space of one of the participants.
There are also rules for operating on these representations.
For example, we have found it useful to allow the representation
of a belief about one's own belief. But in general we collapse
this representation by invoking a rule of the form:
SB SB X ===> SB X
Figure 7 shows how using this rule and the definition of
mutual belief one can derive various equivalences within the
notation system, e.g., that although "P believes it is mutually
believed that X" is not equivalent to "Q believes it is mutually
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believed that X," the conjunction of these two is equivalent to
mutual belief. Such manipulations are useful since one of the
most interesting things that has emerged in the examples that we
have looked at is a shifting in and out of mutual belief--
successive establishments of mutual belief, breakdowns, and then
re-establishments.
Insert Figure 7 about here.
Todd and the Toys
In this section we look at a formal representation of a
dialogue to see how mutual belief is established and manipulated
in order to achieve personal goals. This analysis is not some
magical device to see into the participants' heads, but rather a
way to represent one observer's interpretation (mine) which might
be compared then to someone else's. Thus the analysis is
necessarily limited to a point of view.
The example, taken from a corpus of natural conversations
(Hall, Linn & Nagy, 1984), is part of a conversation between a
mother and her four and a half year old son. Let's call the boy,
"Todd," and the mother, "Susan." Todd is in the living room
playing with his father's tools and his mother is in an adjoining
room:
1. Susan: Go into your room and play, Todd, and . .
2. [She comes into the room,
3. and helps Todd put his father's tools away.
4. Todd holds a tool.]
5. S: What have you got now?
6. That's not a toy!
7. Todd: We're putting them back.
8. S: You're putting it back? Very . . .
9. T: Can I have these batteries?
10. S: No,
11. yeah, the batteries .
12. and how many times did Daddy say not to go in his kit?
Our analysis will allow us to address certain puzzling
features of the dialogue. For example, notice that in lines 5,
6, and 8, Susan refers in the singular, whereas Todd, in line 7
uses the plural to refer to the same object(s). Note also that
in line 7 Todd says that the two of them ("we") are putting away
the objects, whereas, Susan in line 8 says that it is Todd's
("you") action which is in question. Are these examples of mis-
communication? Do they just represent "noise" that one should
expect in normal conversation? Do Todd and Susan see the
object(s) in question as respectively singular and plural? Do
they have different views about who is carrying out the actions
in question?
The analysis to follow will make the case that, far from
being noise, such apparent mis-matches are crucial to
understanding what the dialogue is all about. In particular, the
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difference arises because of simultaneous, but conflicting
attempts to manipulate mutual belief.
Establishing Mutual Belief
Consider the dialogue at the point at which Susan says, "Go
into your room and play, Todd." The essential thing Susan
believes at this point is that they are entering into a social
episode, working together for a common goal, which involves on
Todd's part, getting the tools in the box. Figure 8 shows her
belief that Todd wants to achieve the state, "tools in box."
Meanwhile, Todd believes that Susan believes that it's a mutual
belief that that's exactly what they are doing. But he is still
playing with the tools. He also realizes that there is a
conflict (represented by the dotted arrow) between his intention
to play and the intention she wishes him to have--to get the
tools into the box (Figure 9).
Insert Figures 8 and 9 about here.
----------------------------------
Now let's consider Susan's view of the world in more detail.
She believes Todd has the intention to play in his room, which
means he must go in the room and play with his toys there. But
she also wants him to get the tools in the box. Achieving that
intention will take away the toys Todd is playing with, which,
Susan understands, would be a conflict for Todd if he were, in
fact, intending to play. But that conflict would be resolved by
the fact that once he gets into his room, there will be other
toys to play with.
Todd is holding a tool in a manner that suggests play. He's
clearly not putting it away. When Susan realizes that Todd
doesn't have the intention of putting away the tools her belief
about their mutual belief changes. The social episode starts to
dissolve, and she must re-establish it as a social fact. Figure
10 says that Susan wants to re-achieve the mutual belief space
that corresponds to this social episode. Within that intention
is re-establishing Todd's intention to get the tools in the box.
Insert Figure 10 about here.
------- - --
Recognizing the conflict between the intention she wants him
to have and the one she believes he has leads her to act. She
says (lines 5 and 6), "What have you got now? That's not a toy!"
This is an attempt to change his intention by a retrospective
establishment of meaning--defining what counts as a toy. She's
also redefining the action, saying that what they are doing is
not just putting tools away, it is putting non-toys away. These
assertions directly address Todd's plan to play with the tools.
Susan is saying, "If you look at what you are trying to do,
you'll see that it's contradictory to the actual state of
affairs." Note that Susan is acting on the basis of her
interpretation of Todd's goals, forming hypotheses in the same
way that we, as observers, are doing.
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Todd (line 7) replies, "We're putting them back." He
affirms that he wants to get the tools into the box; but to
achieve that state he has to have the tools in his hand. Having
a tool in his hand is a necessary subgoal to achieve the goal
that Susan wanted all along. He may still have the intention of
playing, but he clearly wants to achieve the state in which his
mother believes that it's mutually believed that he is putting
the tools away (see Figure 11). More precisely, his use of "we"
in line 7 suggests that he either believes, or more likely, wants
his mother to believe that they are engaged in a true social
action in which they are both putting tools away. Regardless of
whether he really wants to be putting them away, he wants to make
his mother think that that's what's happening.
Insert Figure 11 about here.
Susan continues (line 8) with a skeptical, "You're putting
it back? Very . . ." She wants to keep things moving along so
she confirms his reassurance despite her doubts about his true
intentions. Using "you" to refer to Todd and "it" to refer to
the tool she focuses on the specific act of putting a dangerous
tool away. In effect, she asserts that if his statement and his
physical actions support the assumption that the mutual belief
state has been re-established, she will not question him further.
She asserts that it is mutually agreed they are putting the tools
away (as in Figure 8), even though she may believe at some level
that Todd still has the beliefs shown in Figure 11. Later (line
12) she reinforces this settlement and turns it into a teaching
activity regarding what things count as toys.
Apparent Miscommunication
With the foregoing analysis in mind we can return now to
consider the "them" versus "it" problem mentioned above. It may
help in doing this to consider two hypothetical dialogues:
(A) Susan: Let's put these tools away.
Todd: OK. Where should we put them?
Susan: Put the big ones on the table and the little
ones in the box.
(B) Todd: Let's play with the hammer.
Susan: OK. What should I do with it?
Todd: Use it to pound the table.
Dialogue (A) manifests the Put-Away view of the world. Note
that under this view all the references are plural, i.e., they
are to "tools" as a collection of undifferentiated objects, all
of which are to be put away. Dialogue (B) manifests the Play
view. In contrast to (A), the references in (B) are to a
singular object ("the hammer"). Playing implies assigning
singular, significant status to the objects used in the play.
How Todd thinks of the tool may be more important than its
nominal function, in fact, its usual function is only one idea
for how it might be used in play.
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Our analysis of the real dialogue suggests that it is Todd
who has the Play view and Susan who wants to Put-Away. But
notice how each refers to the tool(s). It is Todd who says,
"We're putting them back,"; Susan who says, "That's not a toy"
and "You're putting it back?". Thus they seem to switch roles.
There are two levels of reference to consider here. First,
whether the, let's say, hammer, is one of many tools or a
singular, interesting toy is a matter of individual beliefs and
intentions. Thus, reference to it/them is conditioned by what
participants believe. In the social world we must hypothesize
about a person's beliefs even to infer what objects are
physically available for reference.
Second, Susan and Todd are in a true dialogue in which they
are each attempting to understand and alter each other's beliefs
and intentions. What appears as a talking past each other is in
fact a reflection of their coinciding attempts to take account of
the other's beliefs. Thus, Susan, who wants the two to be in a
Put-Away social episode, uses the singular reference, not because
she sees the hammer as a plaything, but because she sees that
Todd does, and wishes by her focus on it in his terms to more
effectively alter his intentions. Similarly, Todd, who is
undoubtedly in Play mode, probably has specific plans for the
hammer as a singular, significant object. Nevertheless, he
refers to it as part of a "them" because he sees that Susan is
viewing it that way, and moreover, he sees that she intends for
him to view it likewise. Independent of his decision whether to
go along with her desires, he decides it is useful strategically
to appear to cooperate with her intention about what he should
intend. His action appears in his form of reference.
The strategic use of reference to the "tools"--Susan's
saying "it" because she believes Todd is thinking "they" when she
wishes him to think otherwise (vice versa, in Todd's case)--is
paralleled in the reference to the actor(s) involved. Thus, Todd
says "we" because he believes Susan believes he is not engaged in
the desired plan (i.e., that she believes that he doesn't intend
to put away the tools).and he wants to have her change this
belief about his intentions. Susan says "you" for converse
reasons.
From this we see a resolution of the questions presented
previously. Effective communication is not a function of exact
reference, even if such a thing were possible. Instead, apparent
mis-reference may actually reflect a high degree of coordination
and understanding between participants who are operating in a
dynamic social setting in which references are actions to
communicate about and change one another's beliefs, intentions,
and plans.
Open Questions
The approach presented here has been applied in studies of
natural conversations, stories, and Sesame Street skits. These
studies raise a number of important questions about the role of
the author (in the case of presented social interactions), the
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effects of modality, discourse conventions, representation of
process, the size of planning units, complexity and background
knowledge. One interesting phenomenon that emerges in the
studies done thus far concerning the role of the author (or lack
thereof). We saw this in our analysis of "Hansel and Gretel"
(Bruce & Newman, 1978): Hansel goes along a path dropping
pebbles. But he stops each time he drops one so that his mother
and father become suspicious and say, "What are you stopping for .
now?" Hansel replies, "Oh, I'm looking at the cat that's on the
roof." They say "that's not a cat, that's just the sunlight
reflecting on the roof."
This interaction is unnecessary from the point of view of
just marking a trail. One reason it happens is that the authors
are trying to highlight the importance of Hansel's actions for
the reader, and also to indicate who believes what. They show
(1) that Hansel is deliberately dropping pebbles, (2) that he
knows what's going on, and (3) that his parents don't. When
we're analyzing "Hansel and Gretel" we might temporarily ignore
the author and just look at Hansel and Gretel in their
interaction with their parents. But such an analysis is
necessarily tentative. In general, one must integrate the
character level analysis with analysis of the interaction of
plans and beliefs between the author and the reader.
We need to investigate the extent to which models of
planning can be used in rhetorical theory (see Brewer &
Lichtenstein, 1982), in particular, the relationship between
author and reader in terms of author's goals and reader's goals,
author's beliefs about reader's beliefs, reader's beliefs about
what the author believes about the reader, and so on. When there
are stories within stories each of the levels adds two more
participants, each of whom has beliefs about each other, and also
about characters in their stories (Bruce, 1981).
Closely related to questions about author/reader
relationship are questions about discourse structure and
convention. How much does the carrying out of a plan by a
character constrain the discourse structure that can be produced?
How do we separate the conventional aspects of a story (e.g.,
setting, character stereotypes, and so on) from the underlying
plans?
There have been some efforts at computer simulation of
social planning (Cohen & Perrault, 1979; Perrault & Allen, 1980).
This work addresses many of the limitations of the robot model
work (see Sidner, Bates, Bobrow, Goodman, Haas, Ingria, Israel,
McAllester, Moser, Schmolze, & Vilain, 1983). Designing systems
that can cope with belief-based models is a formidable task.
Another question concerns the size of planning units: To
what level should we break down actions? For example, should the
action of putting away tools be taken as a unit? It is a subpart
of the action of going into the bedroom to play and has subparts
such as picking up tools and putting them in a box. The
appropriate level of representation appears to be a consequence
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of the interaction itself. This raises important questions about the
formal representation of plans.
Another interesting question regards complexity: Producing
plans and recognizing plans are both complex tasks, but what is
the main contributor to complexity? Newman (1982) has analyzed
several Sesame Street skits (starring Bert and Ernie) showing
various degrees of complexity in the skits themselves and in
viewers' interpretations. For example, one skit has six distinct
interpretations. From this work it appears that the degree of
embedding of intentions and beliefs is not the primary source of
complexity differences. What appears more salient is the
complexity of beliefs that need to be maintained outside of the
mutual belief space.
A final question is how background knowledge comes into
play. In the Sesame Street skits it helps to know that Ernie
typically tricks Bert, despite Bert's greater knowledge about
some domains. Similarly, in "Hansel and Gretel," beliefs about
cutting wood, building fires, and so on, are crucial both for
characters in the story and the reader.
Summary
This paper has examined the role of plan recognition and
plan generation in communication. One idea that emerges from
this examination is that people in interaction with others appear
to organize their perceptions of a social situation in terms of
plans. They do this even when the others' plans are poorly
formulated. They use their models of others' plans in
formulating their own plans. Much of what occurs in discourse
centers on a continual communication about and reformulation of
one's own plans and one's models of others' plans.
A second idea that emerges is that formal methods for
describing and analyzing plans are now available. Such methods
allow us to be more explicit in our hypotheses about social
interaction. Unfortunately, the classical formalisms for
planning are derived from a robot world model that fails to
generalize sufficiently to account for typical human planning
situations.
By pushing the classical model we come to the third main
idea of this chapter, namely, that a model of planning with
concepts such as mutual belief at its core may take us further in
our studies of discourse and other forms of social interaction.
In particular, such a model addresses a number of
characteristics central to human planning: Plans are essentially
social, involving cooperation and/or conflict between
individuals. They operate in a space of social facts, not just
physical states. As such, they are built upon participants'
beliefs and their beliefs about each others' beliefs. The
classical model's state variables, operators and goals are then
beliefs of participants that evolve throughout the interaction.
This is one reason why the human planning world emphasizes talk
about plans, not just design and execution of them. Moreover,
generation and recognition of plans become necessarily
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intermingled since each individual's plan is only part of a
larger social plan. Finally, the human plan has a historical
character to it. Each action produces irreversible changes in
others' beliefs, including, of course, the belief that the given
action was carried out.
Using a mutual belief model that attempts to take account of
these characteristics of human plans we looked at a simple
dialogue. It is clear from the analysis that elements of the
model, e.g., mutual belief, social episode, goal conflict, and so
on, are necessary for modeling such dialogues, but not
sufficient. More complex dialogues and texts will undoubtedly
require further elaboration of the model.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Initial state in the robot world.
Figure 2. Goal state in the robot world.
Figure 3. Representation of beliefs: Person P believes
proposition X.
Figure 4. Representation of intentions: P intends to achieve X.
Figure 5. Representation of intentions: P intends to maintain
X.
Figure 6.
Figure 7.
Figure 8.
Figure 9.
Figure 10.
Figure 11.
A social episode.
Equivalences among belief representations.
Susan's initial model: Cooperative action.
Todd's initial model: Goal conflict.
Susan's recognition of the goal conflict.
Todd's goal of conflict resolution.
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